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Abstract: The myth ‘cry wolf’ continues to pose particular problems for campaigners, policy makers and practitioners. 
This paper subjects this myth, and the way in which it has been debated, to critical scrutiny with a view to suggesting an 
alternative and better way of challenging the presumption both in theory and in practice that women ‘cry wolf’. In 
reflecting on lessons learned that presume believability in establishing rapport from the treatment of children in sexual 
offence cases the paper suggests that such practices can maximise efficacy in the treatment of women in cases of rape. 
It concludes that by leaving accusatory language behind, complainants, practitioners and judicial parties may experience 
more successful pathways to truth.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The events surrounding Dominique Strauss-Kahn in 
May 2011 brought back into the public domain a range 
of questions pertaining to the success or otherwise of 
allegations of rape and/or sexual assault. 
Unfortunately, those events gave new meaning to the 
question asked by Belknap (2010:1341) “‘Can a victim 
ever charge a powerful, wealthy, and/or celebrity male 
with rape without being seen as a “gold-digger” or/and 
a “liar”’. It offered a timely reminder of the continued 
‘importance of being perfect’ (Adler 1987) on the part of 
the rape complainant, whether inside or outside of the 
witness box, along with the persistent power of the 
myths that surround cases of rape and/or sexual 
assault (the sex of the complainant notwithstanding). 
This paper focuses on one feature of those myths that 
continues to pose particular problems for campaigners, 
policy makers and practitioners: the belief that women 
‘cry wolf’. 
The view expressed by Sir Matthew Hale in 1680 
that rape ‘is an accusation easily to be made and hard 
to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party 
accused, tho’ never so innocent’ (quoted by Gavey and 
Gow 2001:343) reflects a deeply held historical and 
contemporary resonant view that women (and children) 
lie. This view, endorsed in Greek mythology and 
religious texts such as the Bible, implies that women 
engage in claiming rape as an act of revenge, fantasy, 
or deceit to hide her own sexual appetite or deviancy. 
Indeed the presumed female capacity for deceit  
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underpins a number of the myths that surround rape. 
Myths, that as Brown and Horvath (2009:332) point out, 
‘….become part of a self-supporting system whereby 
the absence of convictions supports the belief that 
women falsify claims or men’s behaviour does not 
justify the charge’, as in the media coverage of the 
case of Dominique Strauss-Kahn with which this paper 
began.  
The fear of false allegation in cases of rape has 
informed legal doctrine in a number of ways from the 
corroboration warning to the historical immunity given 
to ‘marital rape’ (Rumney 2006). There is also evidence 
to suggest that this fear has informed and continues to 
inform policing and prosecution decisions (see inter alia 
Brownmiller 1975; Jordan 2008; Stanko and Williams 
2009) and awareness of the likelihood of being 
accused of lying impacts upon complainants’ 
willingness to report (Stern 2010). Indeed media 
coverage of false allegations (and here the Strauss-
Kahn case is no exception) has served to fuel debates 
in the U.K. and elsewhere that defendants should be 
given the same right to anonymity as complainants 
(Ministry of Justice 2010; Gavey and Gow 2001). It is 
worth noting that such debates have been generated 
on the flimsiest (if any) evidence (Ministry of Justice 
2010). All of which illustrates the considerable 
ideological sensitivities that continue to exist on the 
veracity of women. Moreover, and perhaps more 
importantly, over the last twenty years a good deal of 
criminal justice resource in a wide range of jurisdictions 
has been devoted to improving responses to sexual 
assault. Yet it would seem that the intractable problem 
of beliefs around women (and children) ‘crying wolf’ 
remains. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that 
this takes a particular toll on vulnerable complainants 
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who may be the least able to deal with what has 
happened to them (Stanko and Williams 2009). So the 
question that Kelly (2010:1346) asks; ‘Why does the 
spectre of false allegations cast a sceptical shadow 
over the words of every woman and child?’ remains 
pertinent.  
The purpose of this paper then is to subject this 
particular myth, and the way in which it has been 
debated, to critical scrutiny with a view to suggesting 
an alternative, and hopefully better, way of challenging 
the presumption both in theory and in practice that 
women (and children) ‘cry wolf’. In order to do this, the 
paper falls into three parts. In the first part we shall 
consider some of the problems associated with 
understanding and defining what counts as a ‘false 
allegation’ in cases of rape and sexual assault. In the 
second part we shall consider the evidence that exists 
on the extent of such allegations. In the third and final 
part we shall consider the efficacy of understanding 
false allegations as a product of different and 
competing interests in the production of the truth about 
what actually happened, and how an holistic 
appreciation of this truth production process, might 
further policy and practice. However, first of all it will be 
useful to consider what is actually meant by the term 
‘false allegation’ in the context of rape and sexual 
assault. 
FALSE ALLEGATION: WHAT DOES THIS MEAN? 
Put at its simplest a ‘false allegation’ occurs when a 
complainant deliberately fabricates an event that they 
know actually did not occur (Norfolk 2011; Lisak et al. 
2010). This would seem to be fairly obvious and 
straightforward. However, as commentators from a 
range of disciplinary perspectives have observed, for 
all practical purposes, there is in reality no consensus 
on what actually constitutes a ‘false allegation’ this 
simple definition notwithstanding. (See as an example 
of this debate the range of contributions to the journal 
Violence Against Women 2010 volume 16). Moreover, 
definitions of what constitutes a ‘false allegation’ are 
often conflated with motivations for making such 
allegations and/or indicators are used to measure it.  
Norfolk (2011:228) offers one list of what is meant 
by ‘false’ in this context: retracted, malicious, not 
proceeded with, not proven, mistaken, and coerced. 
Here the conflation between individual motive and 
criminal justice practice is more than apparent. 
Rumney (2006) begins his discussion with the 
presumption that false allegation implies deliberate 
fabrication and from this develops a distinction between 
malicious and non-malicious allegations both of which 
may, in fact, result in being understood as false. 
Malicious allegations may include motives of revenge, 
financial gain, or covering up a ‘night out’ from a 
partner. Non-malicious allegations come in three forms; 
as a result of a medical condition, those that are 
technically false either in law (as, historically, in cases 
of marital rape), or those that are genuinely made but 
shown to be false (as a result of the influence of 
alcohol or drugs). Indeed, Engle and O’Donohue 
(2012) have proceeded to offer an analysis of eleven 
pathways into ‘false allegations’: lying, implied consent, 
false memories, intoxication, anti-social personality 
disorder, borderline personality disorder, histrionic 
personality disorder, delirium, psychotic disorders, 
dissociation, and intellectual disability. Moreover, 
alongside these issues, that focus attention on the 
problems presented by the complainant, it is important 
to add criminal justice practices.  
Much feminist informed critique has put the spotlight 
on policing practices around rape and sexual assault in 
relation to false allegations. These practices appear to 
conflate the recording of crimes as ‘unfounded’ and the 
practice of ‘no-criming’ with false allegation (see for 
example Kelly 2010). Whilst in the U.K. there are strict 
guidelines governing the use of ‘no-criming’, the 
slippage in the application of these guidelines has been 
well documented. Indeed the Ministry of Justice 
(2010:35) reported that there was a ‘misbelief that no-
criming or an acquittal necessarily meant the allegation 
was false’; there was ‘variation in interpretation of the 
no-crime category’, and that there was ‘general 
inconsistent police practice in no-criming’. These 
practices reflect a tendency to redefine women’s voices 
(Kelly 2010) and point to the tensions that exist 
between the complainant’s voice (wanting to be heard) 
and criminal justice imperatives (the search for 
corroborative evidence). When policing practices are 
overlaid with those of the Crown Prosecution Service 
(CPS), whose role as gatekeeper in the criminal justice 
system is pivotal in whether or not a case proceeds to 
court, these processes are compounded. Indeed, 
studies of the attrition rate of crimes of sexual violence 
in particular indicate that CPS involvement is a 
significant moment in this process (see inter alia 
Walby, Armstrong and Strid 2011). Whilst little 
empirical work has documented the day to day 
understandings of CPS professionals of false 
allegations per se, it is not too far-fetched to suggest 
that their overriding concern with the pursuit of cases 
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‘in the public interest’ is likely to add another layer of 
complexity to what counts as ‘false’. 
In summary, the discussion so far points to three 
issues. First, it is evident that what counts as ‘false’ 
(and as we shall see, how it is counted) is highly 
contentious. Second, tensions exist between what the 
complainants’ experiences might look like, how they 
remember them, what importance they assign to 
different aspects of that experience, and their motives 
for reporting their experiences; and the legal, cultural 
and professional context that frames the way in which 
criminal justice professionals respond to those 
experiences. Third, by implication, our attention is 
drawn to the tensions that potentially exist between 
everyday understandings of ‘true’ and ‘false’ and the 
criminal justice understandings of these terms for 
evidential purposes. As Jordan (2004:51) reminds us; 
Whether or not an offence actually 
occurred is different from whether or not it 
can be proven to have occurred; for the 
victim of rape, the first concern is 
understandably more pressing, but 
because of their role in the prosecution 
process, it is the latter which is of primary 
importance to the police. 
In the light of this discussion much remains to be 
said about how, the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth, is produced. This issue will be returned to 
in part three of this paper. First it will be of value to 
consider what evidence exists as to the nature and 
extent of ‘false’ allegations. How big a problem is this, 
and if it is a problem, who for? 
FALSE ALLEGATION: NATURE AND EXTENT 
Concern about the nature and extent of false 
allegations has clearly fuelled debates for policy 
change, especially around the question of anonymity 
for defendants as well as complainants. Rumney 
(2006:129) and Norfolk (2011:229) both list a wide 
range of studies that have been conducted on the 
nature and extent of such allegations from the 1970s 
onwards. Taken together these studies suggest an 
alarming range in the extent of such allegations, from 
2% to 90%. Indeed, Saunders (2012:18) notes; ‘the 
only thing we know with any certainty about the 
prevalence of false allegations of rape is that we do not 
know how prevalent they are’. Such a disparity clearly 
indicates that different studies use different definitions 
and different counting measures to achieve their 
estimates. No wonder that the Ministry of Justice 
(2010:34) report states that;  
‘Concrete evidence about the extent of 
false rape allegations is limited and 
confused, and what exists is based on 
perceptions of practitioners and research 
involving small samples’. 
There is however, another issue at play here that is 
alluded to in the analysis offered by Rumney (2006). 
He suggests two trends in the empirical investigation of 
false allegations: one that starts from the assumption 
that women are very likely to make such claims, and 
the second, that emerged in the 1970s, that starts from 
the assumption that false allegations are no more likely 
in cases of rape than any other criminal cases. He 
goes on to suggest that the 2% figure, first quoted by 
Susan Brownmiller in 1975, has since become the 
consensus figure despite there being very little 
evidence to support it. Rumney’s (2006) analysis of this 
notwithstanding, he is clearly pointing to the way in 
which the nature and extent of false allegations, in and 
of itself, has been debated more on the basis of belief 
rather than evidence. Indeed, the very different 
approaches to this topic that he highlights point to the 
depth with which views as to whether or not women 
‘cry wolf’ are held and the profound effect these views 
have on the myths and the evidence that surround this 
question.  
Rumney’s (2006) precautionary advice 
notwithstanding, in a recent comparative study across 
9 European countries Kelly (2010:1352) reports that 
rates of false allegation ‘ranged between 1% and 9% 
with the majority at 6%’. From a point of view, whatever 
figure is arrived at, it is clear that the practices that 
produce such figures are hugely variable, and as Kelly 
(ibid) intimates, are a product of systemic tensions 
rather than individuals with a ‘bad’ attitude. On the 
basis of these findings Kelly calls for an international 
agreement on how false allegations should be counted 
and, in the light of this brief review of the data, it is not 
difficult to have some sympathy with this call. However 
the question arises as to what problem(s) such an 
agreement would solve? It would certainly result in a 
common framework for understanding the counting of 
false allegations as distinct from allegations that are 
no-crimed and/or unfounded that may in turn lead to a 
cultural change within criminal justice professionals in 
how they view each of these categories. Thus, the 
problem of false allegations would be better evidenced 
and thereby better understood by researchers, 
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politicians, and policy makers. However, would this 
really tackle the tensions between what each of those 
party to the criminal justice process in dealing with 
cases of rape and sexual assault, from the complainant 
onwards, expect from their involvement in that 
process? Is there a different and/or better way to 
generate the requirements for evidence (the criminal 
justice search for the ‘truth’) without denying the 
complainant’s desire to he heard (what s/he took to be 
what actually happened: their ‘truth’?). Is it time, for all 
practical purposes, to leave the language of ‘false 
allegation’ behind us?  
THINKING DIFFERENTLY ABOUT THE SEARCH 
FOR TRUTH 
The perseverance and universality of the problem of 
‘truth’ and why it may be time to think differently about 
it is illustrated in the mythological story of Cassandra. 
This story acknowledges the difficulty in convincing a 
male-dominated society to hear, understand, and heed 
a woman's message (Vagelatos 1995). The myth 
reflects reality, even in modem times, with often age-
old customs and enduring laws written as if women 
were childlike frivolous beings not to be taken seriously 
or believed (Ronner 1997; see supra note 14:130). The 
assumption that children and women are of a similar 
ilk; interestingly defined as trusting yet, in the sexual 
sphere, not to be trusted, is key to understanding the 
concerns of this paper. It is evident that when reports of 
sexual assault fall outside of the widely accepted stock-
stories of rape (Wheatcroft, Wagstaff and Moran 2009) 
complainants/victims are still likely to be met with 
scepticism and mistrust by communities and 
professionals alike. How might it be possible to both 
challenge and change such perceptions? 
Over twenty-five years ago, (Estrich 1987) made the 
distinction between ‘real rape’ and ‘simple rape’. She 
suggests that real rape is the stereotypical situation 
involving one or several factors: a victim and an 
offender, who are unknown to one another, an 
interracial combination such as a white victim and a 
black stranger perpetrator(s), visible physical injury, 
and the use of force or a weapon. ‘Simple rape’ 
however is thought to contain characteristics that make 
them appear less serious, for example, they are 
typically perpetrated by someone the victim knows, do 
not result in injuries or employ weapons, and there may 
be no witnesses or accomplices. ‘Real rapes’ are more 
clear-cut in terms of lack of consent and are viewed as 
more serious and easier to prosecute. As such the ‘real 
rape’ stock-story unifies police and prosecution in 
decisions about priorities – particularly from a resource 
point of view. ‘Simple rapes’ are less likely therefore to 
proceed through the criminal justice system, and less 
likely to be taken seriously, despite constituting the 
majority of rape and sexual assault cases (Tjaden and 
Thoennses 2006). Moreover, complainants/victims 
themselves are subject to these same mistaken 
distinctions and as a result may doubt their own 
experience if it does not fit within the most widely 
accepted and represented definition of real rape/sexual 
assault. All of which, when taken together, adds to a 
systemic predisposition of ‘falsehood’, ‘crying wolf’, 
and/or telling lies being particularly associated to 
‘simple rapes’, which nevertheless, constitute the 
majority of rape and sexual assault experiences, they 
remain the least likely to ‘succeed’ within the criminal 
justice system. The reasons as to why these patterns 
persist are arguably, multi-layered. 
As noted earlier, women (and children) are by 
definition among the least powerful people in society 
perceptually making them peculiarly susceptible to 
disbelief in perception. Yarbrough and Bennett (2000) 
suggest that when powerful institutions’ or individuals’ 
claims are juxtaposed against those of less powerful or 
powerless institutions and individuals, the attachment 
of credibility to the powerful itself becomes indicia of 
power. This structural relationship of credibility 
becomes particularly potent when overlaid with the 
normative assumptions associated with heterosexual 
behaviour. Women may be considered, by men, to be 
sexually manipulative (Muehlenhard and Hollabaugh 
1988) that can nurture in some men an entitlement to 
this (sexual) resource because that is what men have a 
right to (see also Scully 1990). Alternatively women can 
be viewed as cautious in their sexual relations and by 
definition want to be ‘taken’ (for an historical analysis of 
this see D’Cruze 2011).  
The law, in both theory and practice needs to be 
situated within this wider social framing of power 
relationships and in doing so Naffine (2003) asks the 
question: who are law’s persons? In an intriguing 
analysis of this question she argues that in the ever 
‘diminishing circle’ of the person of law, from the most 
general (being human) to the more particular (being in 
possession of moral and legal responsibility), ‘we 
exclude young children, and the adult incompetent. We 
also implicitly exclude wives who are unable to 
establish the complete autonomy of their will from that 
of their husband’ (ibid:366). She goes on to argue that 
in terms of practice the most general form of laws’ 
person (being human) is largely sidelined for that 
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person who has moral and legal responsibility. This 
person is who she has termed elsewhere as ‘the 
rational man of law’ (Naffine 1990). This gradual 
curtailment of law’s person has real consequences in 
terms of what is understood to be reasonable course of 
action in particular circumstances. Set against this 
backcloth the findings reported by Saunders (2012) on 
the persistence of beliefs surrounding rape cases on 
the part of practitioners need to be understood.  
Judges, for example, do try to be impartial and 
derive decisions purely from the law and evidence. 
However, research suggests that, what are referred to 
as, ‘anchored narratives’ can be influential (Wagenaar, 
vanKoppen and Crombag 1993). These anchors can 
be described as common sense rules generally 
expected to be true: unquestioned assumptions 
concerning people, behaviour, and ideas. They reflect 
presumptions about the person of law: the benchmark 
against what and who counts as ‘reasonable’ under 
particular circumstances. Importantly, these 
assumptions can reflect stereotypes that attach 
narratives to commonly held perceptions (i.e. ‘once a 
thief always a thief’ or ‘drug abusers are always 
thieves’). Such narratives may be implicitly embedded 
within legal decision making (rather than explicitly) but 
their significance in relation to sexual assault cannot be 
denied. For example, Beichner and Spohn (2012:3) 
report:  
‘Our results reveal that although charging 
decisions in stranger cases are largely 
determined by legally relevant factors, 
these decisions in non-stranger cases are 
affected by several legally irrelevant victim 
characteristics: whether the victim had a 
prior criminal record, whether the victim 
had been drinking alcohol prior to the 
assault, and whether the victim invited the 
suspect to her residence. Further analysis, 
however, revealed that only the victim's 
prior record had a differential effect on 
charging decisions in cases involving 
strangers and non-strangers and in 
aggravated and simple rape cases. Our 
results suggest that the focal concerns 
that guide prosecutors' charging decisions 
incorporate specific victim behaviors and 
background characteristics.’ 
These findings point to not only the continued 
efficacy of the real rape/simple rape dichotomy held by 
practitioners but also the power that anchored 
narratives (in this example about the variables that 
count as evidence for real rape/simple rape) in fuelling 
decision making. Thus for our purposes this affords 
one way of understanding how aspects of a complaint 
are likely to be dealt with as credible or otherwise. 
Worryingly, anchors do not need to be correct or even 
held in common but their combined effect is no less 
telling (Wheatcroft, 2012). Thus, as Kelly also notes, 
‘legacies remain sedimented into institutional cultures 
and practices, creating a risk of over-identification of 
false allegations by police and prosecutors’ 
(2010:1345).  
In summary, there is obvious public interest in 
determining the credibility of sexual assault. Historically 
however the law in general, sexual offence laws in 
particular, and public stereotypes surrounding both 
women (Jordan 2004) and children (Quinn 1988; Yates 
and Musty 1988) have led to the perception of these 
groups of complainants as not to be trusted and to be 
observed largely as storytellers. These cultural 
stereotypes inform more than criminal justice practice 
important as this is. For example, the percentage of 
rapes reported to police that result in a conviction is 
notoriously small across many countries, including 
England and Wales (Walker, Kershaw and Nicholas 
2006), South Africa (South African Law Commission, 
n.d.) and the United States (Sinclair and Bourne 1998). 
These small percentages might partially be explained 
by pervasive myths and stereotypes; those ‘prejudicial, 
stereotyped or false beliefs about rape, rape victims, 
and rapists’ (Burt 1980:217) that are widely held in 
society and affect decision making at each stage of the 
criminal justice process. At their most acute, according 
to Ms Saunders, chief prosecutor for London, ‘juries 
acquitting suspects is now the largest reason for 
failures in rape prosecutions’. She also said ‘society 
should challenge myths including commonly held 
beliefs that rape was carried out by strangers in dark 
alleys and that women who were drunk were asking to 
be attacked’ (Davenport 2012). Moreover, myths are 
not contained to uninvolved observers but can also be 
present in the alleged victim. For example, Weiss 
(2009) found that one in five victims in the United 
States excused or justified their offender’s behaviour, 
often drawing on myths and stereotypes as indicated 
here.  
So, anchored narratives around what and who is, 
and is not, to be believed have an impact in a myriad of 
ways. However, what if we started in a different place? 
What if we accepted the belief (i.e., what we term here 
‘interactional belief’), that women (and children), on the 
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whole, do not lie? What would this imply for anchored 
narratives of practitioners so well highlighted by 
Saunders (2010) and where would that take the debate 
on ‘false allegations’? In making a case for this starting 
point there may be something to be learned, for 
criminal justice practice, from recent initiatives 
designed to address children as victims of sexual 
abuse. 
OUT OF THE MOUTHS OF BABES ……. ? 
There has been a parallel debate in relation to false 
allegation with children as victims of sexual abuse (i.e. 
not believed, telling stories/lying, allege as revenge on 
another), as with women in cases of rape. Here too 
there have been deeply held views that children lie/tell 
stories. However, it has been suggested (Davies 1992) 
that children as young as six years of age can provide 
as accurate information as adults if obtained early. 
Further to this, the extent of false allegations has also 
been subject to scrutiny with Jones and McGraw 
(1987) suggesting that allegations from children stand 
at circa 1%. Kelly (2010) similarly notes that false 
allegations are no higher for rape where adults are 
concerned than for other crimes (see also Gilmore and 
Pittman 1993). The same is the case for children. Yet 
in both kinds of cases (child sexual abuse and adult 
cases of rape/sexual assault) the practitioner role in the 
investigation of crime is not only core (ACPO 2004) it is 
crucial in contributing to the value of the information 
provided by complainants, witnesses, and victims of 
crime (Kebbell and Milne 1998). In 2011, the U.K. 
released a revised version of Achieving Best Evidence 
in Criminal Proceedings: Guidance on interviewing 
victims and witnesses, and guidance on using special 
measures (ABE 2011 - originally drafted in 2002 as 
Guidance for Vulnerable or Intimidated Witnesses, 
Including Children). Of course, adult female rape 
complainants are too considered vulnerable within this 
framework; though the rhetoric for female rape 
complainants continues to be myth-laden with 
consequent echoes of revictimization (Wheatcroft, et al. 
2009). In approaching interactions with children 
research indicates advantages of the rapport phase. 
For example, Collins and Eaton (2013) have 
recognised the necessity of rapport in highlighting that 
interpersonal styles show improvements in children’s 
communication during interviews. Thus, the practitioner 
implications for responding to children may well have 
important, even crucial, parallels facilitating a more 
holistic way of thinking about how to respond to adult 
complainants of rape and sexual assault. This stance is 
notably supported by psychological evidence. 
As is well established, the interaction between 
victims and investigators can strengthen or weaken an 
investigation and thereby has a powerful role in 
whether the case is ultimately prosecuted or not. 
Traditionally, police officers have tended to dominate 
interviews of rape complainants (Kebbell and Westera, 
2011). However, rapport, for example, allows 
opportunity to; a) set conditions which optimise focus, 
communication, memory, and motivation, and b) 
establish a trusting relationship between complainant 
and interviewer (Saywitz, Camparo and Romanoff 
2010). Such a concept is not a new idea, and some 
time ago, Warren, Woodall, Hunt and Perry (1996) 
talked of this process as ‘warming up’. Indeed, 
Patterson (2012) reported that supportive detectives 
who developed rapport with victims, helped produce 
stronger statements, build a stronger case, and prevent 
additional psychological distress to the victim. 
Researchers also agree that the atmosphere created 
by interviewer manner can either facilitate (e.g. 
increase trust) or hinder (e.g. intimidate; closing 
pathways to trust development) the interview process 
(Saywitz and Camparo 1998). Moreover, authoritative 
style can be equally intimidating and affect reliability by 
increasing compliance to misleading information 
(Leichtman and Ceci 1995). This aspect is particularly 
salient in contexts where powerful-powerless meet and 
where stereotypical assumptions of case detail 
implicitly lead.  
Usefully then, a supportive interviewer manner may 
well decrease fears of perceived authority status 
(Carter, Bottoms and Levine 1996). In a study on the 
impact of interviews on rape survivor’s reduction of 
hierarchy accomplished through mutual dialogue 
resulted in greater levels of comfort and disclosure 
(Campbell et al. 2010). Thus, a rapport development 
technique (i.e. commencement or maintenance of a 
trusting relationship perhaps through discussion of 
neutral topics, process, and/or interpersonal approach) 
can be an especially effective tool to encourage truthful 
disclosure. Likewise, the process of rapport may also 
influence and produce longer narratives which have 
been shown to yield more accurate credibility 
assessment of abuse allegations (Hershkowitz, Fisher, 
Lamb and Horowitz 2007). In addition, most individuals 
have limited knowledge of the legal system which can 
contribute to heightened anxiety during investigative 
interviews. Spohn and Tellis (2012) note that victim 
complainants feared the criminal justice system would 
cause them shame, embarrassment, and ultimately 
humiliation. In this regard, evidence shows that high 
levels of anxiety and stress hinder cognitive function, 
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diverts attention and reduces motivation vital for 
accurate memory retrieval (ABE 2011). On this basis 
the context of false allegation is likely to eliminate 
rapport harnessed between the victim and investigator 
(McDowell and Hibler 1993). Given this, the authors 
contend that it is difficult to engage in any meaningful 
rapport and create the appropriate atmosphere of 
trusted and trusting within the context of disbelief in 
which myth and stereotype flourish. Thus a benchmark 
is set premised firmly on interactional belief rather than 
disbelief for the successful resolution of a case. 
Moreover, in order to move this process from one that 
is rooted in disbelief to one rooted in belief it is 
important to appreciate the truth generating process as 
a holistic one in which there are competing 
perspectives and interests. 
For the rape complainant there exist three potential 
interfaced perspectives that are relevant to 
understanding how ‘what happened’ might be made 
sense of: the experiential, the practice, and the legal. 
Each of these perspectives has the potential to 
structure the psychological expectation of 
belief/disbelief on a continuum and when perspectives 
are together, practitioner and legal roles sit inelegantly 
with experiential perspectives. It is within the spaces 
between these differently competing perspectives 
referred to from here on in as anchored narratives that 
the spectre of false allegation takes shape. 
Such anchored narratives are most apparent in 
police practices though not exclusively so police 
interviewers may begin their search for the truth by 
unwittingly examining any available evidence to refute 
the complainant’s claim, for example by asking 
questions such as what were you wearing, was it late 
at night, did you know the person, etc. In their terms 
this counts as ‘testing the evidence’. In asking 
questions such as these police interviewers are taking 
statements in which it is necessarily incumbent upon 
them to provide evidence of believability. So, if the 
offence was theft the interviewer would likely ask what 
happened, when, what was taken, how was it taken. 
The line of question in and of itself reflecting an 
anchored narrative that works for them in making 
sense of what has happened that enables them to 
make a believable case for those in the next stage of 
the prosecution process. Interestingly, in our example 
of theft, interviewers are unlikely to ask, did you leave 
the doors and windows open, was the object freely 
available, on show, etc., thereby suggesting the 
invitation of theft. In ‘testing the evidence’ in cases of 
sexual assault, however, the benchmark of believability 
and it associated anchored narratives results in an 
inverted process of evidence seeking. Thus, 
complainants are asked; have you been drinking, what 
were you wearing, did you invite him in for coffee, and 
so on. In this way it becomes more than evidence that 
the complainants desire to report what happened 
produces narratives that conflict with the practitioner’s 
desire to present a case that is both believable and 
defensible.  
In real terms, this means that individuals, in this 
case police officers, have a tendency to seek an 
explanation for the allegation in and of itself and thus to 
explore how does this narrative compare with the 
stereotype template, how might it be invalidated, rather 
than take the allegation to be the basis of what did 
happen. This is most acute at the stage of police 
intervention and where the CPS demand particular 
evidence that would result in an overwhelmingly strong 
percentage of likely conviction: arguably the 
benchmark of believability not necessarily a reflection 
of what actually happened. This is an important point 
from a cognitive vantage point. If allegations are 
inflated or conflated, and thereby inaccurately 
portrayed, then the perception of those practitioners at 
the interface between law and complainant can simply 
enable a perseverant picture that most claims of rape 
are false.  
A particular point of contention to note is that of the 
need for consistency in evidence. Research has 
demonstrated that when mock-jurors hear inconsistent 
recall testimony they perceive eyewitnesses to be less 
accurate and credible (Berman, Narby and Cutler 1995; 
Brewer et al. 1999). Interestingly though, a study 
conducted by Granhag and Stromwall (2005) found the 
most frequent cue to adult detection of child deception 
was consistency of the child’s statement (see also 
Quas et al. 2007). Problematically, inconsistency could 
operate to lower perceived credibility by lowering 
perceived confidence and thereby believability 
(Wheatcroft, Wagstaff and Kebbell 2004). Thus, while 
law marks consistency as a credible indicator, where a 
consistent report seems to be more accurate or truthful 
(Berman et al. 1995; Brewer, et al. 1999), it is 
nevertheless at odds with research of children. 
Inconsistency has been shown as demonstrating a 
higher degree of accuracy in testimony (i.e. lack of 
rehearsal of testimony, a truer account of real memory 
recall, lack of motivation to manipulate, and so on). The 
same can also apply to adult testimony in which 
inconsistency, differential recall and so on, are 
common features of eyewitnesses’/complainants’ 
testimony. Indeed, this is the nature of recall in 
everyday life. Therefore, from a psychological 
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perspective, inconsistencies and inaccuracies in recall 
are to some extent to be expected (in adults and 
children) in reporting experiences of rape and/or sexual 
assault. However the value of such testimony is doubly 
underpinned by the premise of disbelief. 
Thus we suggest the term false allegation is a 
common sense simplification of a complex legal and 
social arena. Its reliance on myth and stereotype seem 
evident and these appear to have some sense of 
pluralistic influence; i.e. people mistake each other’s 
beliefs by misinterpreting behaviour and then use that 
as evidence for what must be the truth. This represents 
the relevant social-cognition for rape, the interpretation 
of victim behaviour, and judges’ and jurors’ 
understandings of rape complainants and defendants. 
For the interpreter in a complex web of competing 
perspectives it is psychologically safe if the 
responsibility can be diffused; it becomes a place 
where ‘it cannot possibly happen to me’; ‘I don’t have 
the same characteristics as this person’ (complainant 
victim). However, the ways in which common sense 
oversimplifies dangerously underestimates the power 
of social situations in police roles, in interviews, in 
allegation contexts, and in judicial process. The result 
is perseverant thoughts, behaviours and outcomes (i.e. 
we keep thinking and doing the same things and are 
surprised when we continue to get the same results (de 
Shazer 1988). We have opportunity to learn from 
previous mistakes and fail to do so, yet all of which 
seems to have been somewhat better achieved with 
children (see Holliday and Marche 2013). From this 
perspective it is simple to appreciate how practitioner 
police (also subject to cognitive shortcuts), in their 
transactions with the complainant, can blame and/or 
misconstrue rape complainant and/or victims and label 
or report evidence as ‘false allegation’. There exist too 
many spaces in which ‘false allegation’ can surface.  
What emerges from the process of reporting 
through to prosecuting and ultimately conviction, is that 
there are a number of constituent parts that make up 
the whole of ‘false-allegation’. The term represents a 
rigid structure: a crude, shorthand concept in which 
significant attribution errors are at work. The ascriptions 
noted make individuals feel good, enable some sense-
making of what is being presented to them, and assists 
to resolve inner conflicts that surround the event. 
However, such attributions are guided by stereotypical 
beliefs and assumptions; myths. Women ‘cry wolf’. It is 
simply cognitively easier to work from and for a police 
officer, judge or juror, since ‘it cannot possibly happen 
to me - I do not have the same characteristics as this 
person’ anything outside of the safety zone provides 
the conditions for slippage into another ‘false 
allegation’. Yet, as we have suggested here, many of 
these issues have largely been tackled or addressed 
where children are concerned, prior to trial (Holliday 
and March 2013). A key aspect to their avoidance has 
been to begin any investigation of rape or sexual 
assault from the premise of interactional belief. 
CONCLUSION 
It is increasingly obvious that false-allegation as a 
term is confused, lacks clarity, and represents a 
dichotomous variable applied in non-dichotomous 
situations. Importantly, its relative lack of success in 
practice makes it meaningless for policy makers and 
practitioners. Lessons have to be learned from the 
treatment of children in sexual offence cases and their 
efficacy to the treatment of women in cases of rape 
needs to be considered.  
In order to achieve this, maybe there is mileage in 
embracing a case formulation model not a 
pathologising model for all criminal justice practitioners, 
particularly in cases of rape and sexual assault. A case 
formulation model is one that premises belief as its 
opening gambit. This method would aim to disprove the 
‘believability hypothesis’ model rather than using 
disbelief as the general framework from the outset. 
Hart, Sturmey, Logan and McMurran define formulation 
as ‘the process or product of gathering and integrating 
diverse information to develop a concise account’ 
(2011:118). As noted in this paper, approaches to child 
complainants have moved solidly in this direction. 
Despite limited evidence bases, formulation allows for 
more than mere description, diagnosis, or statistic; it 
facilitates explanation, identifies origins of the problems 
and addresses individual need; thus minimising the 
potential for the aggravating influence of myth and 
stereotype. 
Finally, by leaving the accusatory language of false 
allegation behind, complainants, practitioners and 
judicial parties may experience more successful 
pathways to truth. It seems that the debate may now 
reflect a distraction from central issues of approach to 
the false allegation process. Moving in this direction will 
not be easy, since by implication it would mean making 
in-roads into the dominant, for all practical purposes, 
concept of law’s person being the reasonable man of 
law. However as Naffine (2003:367) implies 
understanding the person of law as a human being in 
its most general sense has an important capacity: ‘to 
stand for all’. By means of the lessons learned from 
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practice with children in sexual assault cases the myth 
‘the only good woman is a silent woman’ (Jordan 
2011:278) can begin to be dispelled: but only if 
interpersonal practices, one of which may be 
interactional belief, that derive from the law means the 
law can stand for us all. 
REFERENCES 
Achieving Best Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Guidance on 
interviewing victims and witnesses, and guidance on using 
special measures, ABE 2011. London: Home Office. 
Achieving Best Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Guidance for 
Vulnerable or Intimidated Witnesses, Including Children, ABE 
2002. London: Home Office. 
Adler, Z. 1987. Rape on Trial. London: Routledge, Kegan and Paul. 
Association of Chief Police Officers. 2004. Management of Volume 
Crime. Bramshill, National Centre for Policing Excellence. 
Belknap, J. 2010. “Rape: Too Hard to Report and Too Easy to 
Discredit Victims” Violence Against Women, 16(12):1335–
1344. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1077801210387749 
Beichner, D. and Spohn, C. 2012. Modeling the effects of victim 
behavior and moral character on prosecutors' charging 
decisions in sexual assault cases. Violence and Victims, 
27(1):3-24. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1891/0886-6708.27.1.3 
Berman, G.L., Narby, D.J. and Cutler, B.L. 1995. Effects of 
inconsistent statements on mock jurors’ evaluations of the 
eyewitness, perceptions of defendant culpability and verdicts. 
Law and Human Behavior, 19:79-88. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01499074 
Brewer, N., Potter, R., Fisher, R.P., Bond, N. and Luszcz, M.A. 1999. 
Beliefs and data on the relationship between consistency and 
accuracy of eyewitness testimony. Applied Cognitive 
Psychology, 13(4):297-313. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-
0720(199908)13:4<297::AID-ACP578>3.0.CO;2-S 
Brown, J. and Horvath, M. 2009. “Do you believe her? Is it real 
rape?” Pp. 325-343 in Rape; Challenging Contemporary 
Thinking, edited by M. Horvath and J. Brown. London: 
Routledge-Willan 
Brownmiller, S. 1975. Against our Will: Men, Women and Rape. 
London: Secker and Warburg.  
Burt, M.R. 1980. “Cultural myths and supports for rape.” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 38:217-230.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.38.2.217 
Campbell, R., Adams, A. E., Wasco, S. M., Ahrens, C. E. and Sefl, T. 
2010. “What has it been like for you to talk with me today?: 
The impact of participating in interview research on rape 
survivors.” Violence Against Women, 16(1):60-83. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1077801209353576 
Carter, C., Bottoms, B. and Levine, M. 1996. “Linguistic and socio-
emotional influences on the accuracy of children’s reports.” 
Law and Human Behavior, 20:335–358. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01499027 
Davenport, J. 2012. “Top prosecutor points finger at Johnny Depp 
over rape myths that let suspects go free.” Crime 
correspondent, 30
th
 January 2012. Accessed 28
th
 August at 
http://www.standard.co.uk/news/top-prosecutor-points-finger-
at-johnny-depp-over-rape-myths-that-let-suspects-go-free-
7312932.html 
Davies, G.M. 1992. “Influencing public policy on eye-witnessing: 
Problems and possibilities.” In Psychology and Law: 
International Perspectives edited by F. Losel, D. Bender and 
T. Bliesner. Berlin: De Gruyter 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110879773.265 
D'Cruze, S. 2011. “Sexual violence in history: a contemporary 
heritage?” Pp. 23-52 in Handbook of Sexual Violence edited 
by J. Brown and S. Walklate. London: Routledge. 
de Shazer, S. 1988. Clues: Investigating solutions in brief therapy. 
New York, NY: WW Norton & Company.  
Collins, K. and Eaton, A. 2013. “Communicative scaffolding in the 
rapport phase of child investigative interviews.” Paper 
presented to the 6
th
 Annual Conference of the International 
Investigative Interviewing Research Group, Maastricht 
University, The Netherlands, 3
rd 
- 5
th
 July 2013. 
Engle, J. and O’Donohue, W. 2012. “Pathways to False Allegations 
of Sexual Assault.” Journal of Forensic Psychology Practice, 
12(2):97-123. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15228932.2012.650071 
Estrich, S. 1987. Real Rape. Harvard University Press 
Gavey, V. and Gow, E. 2001. “‘Cry Wolf', Cried the Wolf: 
Constructing the Issue of False Rape Allegations in New 
Zealand Media Texts.” Feminism & Psychology, 11(30):341-
60. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0959353501011003006 
Granhag, P.A., and Stromwall, L.A. 2005. “Children’s repeated lies 
and truths: effects on adults’ judgments and reality 
monitoring scores.” Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 
12(2),345-356. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1375/pplt.12.2.345 
Hart, S., Sturmey, P., Logan, C. and McMurran, M. 2011. “Forensic 
case formulation.” International Journal of Forensic Mental 
Health, 10:118-126. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14999013.2011.577137 
Hershkowitz, I., Fisher, S., Lamb, M.E. and Horowitz, D. 2007. 
“Improving credibility assessment in child sexual abuse 
allegations.” Child Abuse and Neglect, 31:99-110. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chiabu.2006.09.005 
Holliday, R.E. and March, T.A. 2013. Child Forensic Psychology. 
London: Palgrave. 
Jordan, J. 2004. The word of a woman: Police, rape and belief. 
London: Palgrave. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230511057 
Jordan, J. 2008. Serial Survivors: Women’s Narratives of Surviving 
Rape. Sydney: The Federation Press. 
Jordan, J. 2011. Silencing rape, silencing women. Pp. 253-287 in 
Handbook on Sexual Violence edited by J. Brown and S. 
Walklate. London: Routledge. 
Kebbell, M.R. and Milne, R. 1998. “Police officers’ perceptions of 
eyewitness performance in forensic investigations.” Journal 
of Social Psychology, 138(3):323-330. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00224549809600384 
Kebbell, M.R. and Westera, N.J. 2011. “Promoting pre-recorded 
complainant evidence in rape trials: Psychological and 
practice perspectives.” Criminal Law Journal, 35:376-385.  
Kelly, L. 2010. “The (In)credible Words of Women: False Allegations 
in European Rape Research.” Violence Against Women, 
16(12):1345–1355. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1077801210387748 
Leichtman, M.D. and Ceci, S.J. 1995. “The effects of stereotypes and 
suggestion on preschoolers’ reports.” Developmental 
Psychology, 31:568-578. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.31.4.568 
Lisak, D., Gardinier, l., Nicksa, S. and Cote, A. 2010. “False 
Allegations of Sexual Assault: An Analysis of Ten Years of 
Reported Cases.” Violence Against Women 16(12):1318–
1334. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1077801210387747 
McDowell, C.P. and Hibler, N.S. 1993. “False allegations.” Pp. 275-
299 in Practical aspects of rape investigation: A multi-
disciplinary approach edited by R.R. Hazelwood & A.W. 
Burgess. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. 
 
248     International Journal of Criminology and Sociology, 2014 Vol. 3 Wheatcroft and Walklate 
Ministry of Justice 2010. Providing anonymity to those accused of 
rape: An assessment of evidence. Ministry of Justice 
Research Series 20/10. London: Ministry of Justice. 
Muehlenhard, C.L. and Hollabaugh, L.C. 1988. “Do women 
sometimes say no when they mean yes? The prevalence 
and correlates of women's token resistance to sex.” Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 54(5):872-879. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.54.5.872 
Naffine, N. 1990. Law and the Sexes. London: Allen and Unwin 
Naffine, N. 2003. “Who are Law’s Persons? From Cheshire cats to 
responsible subjects.” Modern Law Review, 66(3):346-67. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.6603002 
Norfolk, G.A. 2011. “Leda and the swan – And other Myths about 
Rape.” Journal of Forensic and Legal Medicine, 15:235-32. 
Patterson, D. 2012 online first 11 January. “The impact of Detectives’ 
questioning techniques on rape victims’ disclosure.” Violence 
Against Women.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1077801211434725 
Quas, J.A., Davis, E.L., Goodman, E.S. and Myers, J.E.B. 2007. 
“Repeated questions, deception, and children’s true and 
false reports of body touch.” Child Maltreatment, 12(1):60-67. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1077559506296141 
Quinn, K. 1988. “The credibility of children’s allegations of sexual 
abuse.” Behavioral Science and Law, 6:181-99.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bsl.2370060204 
Ronner, A.D. 1997 supra note 14. “The Cassandra Curse: The 
Stereotype of the Female Liar Resurfaces in Jones v. 
Clinton.” UC Davis Law Review, 31:123-191. Explains that 
the myth of the female liar in many sexual harassment cases 
is a strong obstacle for plaintiffs to overcome. 
Rumney, P. 2006. “False Allegations in Rape.” Cambridge Law 
Journal, 65(1): March, 128-158. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0008197306007069 
Saunders, C.L. 2012 online first 9 August. “The truth, the half-truth, 
and nothing like the truth: Reconceptualizing false allegations 
of rape.” British Journal of Criminology.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azs036 
Saywitz, K., and Camparo, L. 1998. “Interviewing child witnesses: A 
developmental perspective.” Child Abuse & Neglect, 
22(8):825-843. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0145-2134(98)00054-4 
Saywitz, K., Camparo, L.B. and Romanoff, A. 2010. “Interviewing 
children in custody cases: Implications of research and policy 
for practice.” Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 28:542-562. 
Scully, D. 1990. Understanding Sexual Violence. London: Unwin 
Hyman. 
Sinclair, H.C. and Bourne, L.E. 1998. “Cycle of blame or just world: 
Effects of legal verdicts on gender patterns in rape-myth 
acceptance and victim empathy.” Psychology of Women 
Quarterly, 22:575-588. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-6402.1998.tb00178.x 
South African Law Commission (n.d.). Conviction rates and other 
outcomes of crimes reported in eight South African police 
areas: Research Paper 18. Pretoria, South Africa: South 
African Law Commission. 
Spohn, C. and Tellis, K. 2012. “The Criminal Justice System’s 
Response to Sexual Violence.” Violence Against Women, 
18(2):169-192. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1077801212440020 
Stanko, E.A. and Williams, E. 2009. “Reviewing rape and rape 
allegations in London: what are the vulnerabilities of the 
victims who report to the police?” Pp. 207-229 in Rape; 
Challenging Contemporary Thinking edited by M. Horwath 
and J. Brown. London: Routledge-Willan. 
Stern, V. 2010. The Stern Review. London: Government Equalities 
Office. 
Tjaden, P. and Thoennes, N. 2006. Extent, Nature, and 
Consequences of Rape Victimization: Findings From the 
National Violence Against Women Survey. Special Report. 
Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice and the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 
Vagelatos, J. 1995 supra note 5. “Heeding Cassandra: The Neutered 
Mother, the Sexual Family, and Other Twentieth Century 
Tragedies.” Journal of Gender and Law, 5:127-141. 
Critiquing The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and 
Other Twentieth Century Tragedies by Martha Albertson 
Fineman concluding the author provides a new feminist legal 
viewpoint that will impact the debate about single mothers 
and welfare). 
Wagenaar, W.A., vanKoppen, P.J., and Crombag, H.F.M. 1993. 
Anchored narratives: The psychology of criminal evidence. 
Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Walby, S. Armstrong, J. and Strid, S. 2011. “Developing measures of 
multiple forms of sexual violence and their contested 
treatment in the criminal justice system.” Pp. in Handbook on 
Sexual Violence. London: Routledge. 
Walker, A., Kershaw, C. and Nicholas, S. 2006. Crime in England 
and Wales 2005/6. London: Home Office. 
Warren, A.R., Woodall, C.E., Hunt, J.S. and Perry, N.W. 1996. “‘It 
sounds good in theory, but ….’: Do investigative interviewers 
follow guidelines based on memory research?” Child 
Maltreatment, 1:231-245. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1077559596001003006 
Weiss, K.G. 2009. “‘Boys will be boys’ and other gendered accounts: 
An exploration of victims’ excuses and justifications for 
unwanted sexual contact and coercion.” Violence Against 
Women, 15:810-834. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1077801209333611 
Wheatcroft, J.M. 2012. “Judicial Processes”. Pp. 229-246 in Forensic 
Psychology: Crime, Justice, Law, Interventions, 2
nd
 Edn 
edited by G. Davies, & A. Beech, John Wiley & Sons: 
Chichester. 
Wheatcroft, Wagstaff and Kebbell, M.R. 2004. “The influence of 
courtroom questioning style on actual and perceived 
eyewitness confidence and accuracy.” Legal & Criminological 
Psychology, 9:83-101. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/135532504322776870 
Wheatcroft, J.M., Wagstaff, G.F. and Moran, A. 2009. “Re-Victimising 
the victim? How rape victims experience the UK legal 
system.” Victims and Offenders 4(3):265-284. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15564880903048529 
Yarbrough, M. and Bennett, C. (2000), “Cassandra and the “Sistahs”: 
The peculiar treatment of African American women in the 
myth of women as liars.” Gender, Race and Justice, 3:625-
658. 
Yates, A. and Musty, M. 1988. “Preschool children’s erroneous 
allegations of sexual molestation.” American Journal of 
Psychiatry, 145:989-92. 
 
Received on 19-06-2014 Accepted on 14-07-2014 Published on 27-08-2014 
 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.6000/1929-4409.2014.03.20 
 
© 2014 Wheatcroft and Walklate; Licensee Lifescience Global. 
This is an open access article licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/) which permits unrestricted, non-commercial use, distribution and reproduction in 
any medium, provided the work is properly cited. 
